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This paper defines current account crises as current account adjustments that occur 
in the aftermath of a sizable reduction in capital flows. We study the characteristics of 
such current account adjustments, particularly whether they are executed through 
export growth or import contraction. We find significant differences between Asia and 
Latin America, with Asian countries adjusting through export growth and Latin 
America through import contraction. When looking at the fundamentals that explain 
such dissimilar behavior, we conclude that these differences are attributable to 
differences in the degree of openness and financial dollarization with the size of the 
financial sector being irrelevant. We argue that the analysis allows the conclusion 
that “pesified” financial sectors that insulate the domestic financial sector from 
exchange rate movements are better suited to deal with unstable international 
financial markets. 
                                             
1 This paper was written while Sturzenegger visited the Bank of International Settlements. We thank 
Luciana Monteverde for efficient research assistance. Financial support from the Center of Research 
in Finance of the Business School of Universidad Torcuato Di Tella is also kindly acknowledged.    2
I. Introduction 
 
Money has always oppressed people in one of two ways. Either it has been abundant and very 
unreliable, or very reliable but very scarce. 
J. K. Galbraith, The age of Uncertainty 
 
Current account adjustments have been a recurrent event in emerging economies. In 
some cases large adjustments of the current account are the result of sizable shocks 
such as changes in terms of trade, or output upheavals associated to wars and their 
aftermath. However, in other cases, current account adjustment is the result of 
currency crises or sudden stops. Studying the current account crises that result from 
these sudden stops is the main objective of this paper.  
 
Traditional international finance theory has stressed the role played by intertemporal 
issues in determining current account adjustments. According to this view, in the 
simplest, one good specification, the current account improves (worsens) when 
income increases (falls) on a temporary basis, or when income is expected to fall 
(increase) to a new steady state level. Yet, this view works only under the 
assumption that capital flows are available to smooth out these income shocks.  
 
Starting with Krugman’s (1979) seminal contribution, major upheavals currency 
markets have also been studied by a large literature on currency crises.
2 A recent 
review is provided in Krugman (1996).
3 In a currency crisis, either due to deteriorating 
fundamentals, due to increasing costs to maintain a peg, or simply from self fulfilling 
speculation, at some point the monetary authorities feel pressure on their net reserve 
position, and eventually choose to devalue the currency or to move to a floating 
regime. However, a common property of currency crises models is that they are silent 
on the external adjustment that goes together with these upheavals. In fact, most of 
these models do not even allow for current account adjustment. For example, in a 
standard 1st generation currency crisis, loss of reserves is changed for seignorage  
at the time of the crisis as a source of government finance, but aggregate demand 
adjustment is not necessary at any point.
4  
 
This, however, contrasts dramatically with recent experience of currency crises in 
which the economy is forced to make a significant adjustment in its external 
accounts. Calvo (2001) describes this phenomenon very clearly 
 
“One key aspect of recent financial crises affecting emerging economies is that they 
have been accompanied by a major cutback in capital inflows. In Thailand, for 
                                             
2 Some authors, such as Calvo and Vegh (1999) have used the term Balance of Payments crisis, but 
the name seems to be less popular than the standard currency crisis.  
3 And the excellent comments to this paper by Kehoe (1996) and Obstfeld (1996). 
   3
example, these flows were cut by an amount equivalent to 26 per cent of its gross 
domestic product during 1997. To adjust to these interruptions, countries have been 
forced to liquidate their international reserves and reduce their current account 
deficit. It is this last step that causes the most harm to the economy, as to do so 
these countries must lower aggregate demand, that is to say their total spending. In 
practice the amounts involved have been substantial and have consequently resulted 
in sharp falls in output and employment. This phenomenon, known as the Sudden 
Stop, is not experienced by developed countries, where the crises have been much 
less severe, and in many cases have been accompanied by an expansion of credit, 
rather than strong contraction as in the case of the emerging economies. “ 
 
Similarly Edwards (2002) argues that current account reversals are associated to 
sizable reductions in investment and growth performance. Thus, a key issue of the 
recent adjustment experiences has been the need for aggregate spending to adjust 
upon the curtailment of available capital inflows. Under this scenario, current account 
adjustment, is not optimal in the sense of the traditional literature, but rather a 
liquidity constraint adjustment that suddenly (though not necessarily unexpectedly) 
befalls on a given country. This paper will study the economic implications of these 
adjustments. In particular we will be concerned by how these adjustments in 
domestic absorption have occurred, and in particular what scope there is, and what 
are the main determinants, for this adjustments to become export led experiences 
rather than mere aggregate demand contractions. 
 
  We define a current account crisis as a situation where external borrowing 
conditions dramatically change from one year to next, virtually shutting off the country 
from international markets. In this scenario, the country has to adjust the current 
account in order to accommodate itself to available external financing rather than 
choosing what level of borrowing or lending it needs to maximize its intertemporal 
utility. 
 
We believe these current account events, should be distinguished from those arising 
from an optimal adjustment of the current account. The main purpose of this paper is 
therefore, to identify the factors that explain why the aftermaths of an adjustment to a 
current account crisis may be different. In some countries the aftermath is 
characterized by a pick up in growth and exports, whereas in others import 
contraction is the rule. While the literature has focused attention on trying to 
understand the reasons for a sudden stop, and therefore on trying to device 
appropriate prevention measures that may avoid such events, there has been much 
less work, if any, on trying to understand the characteristics of an economy that may 
determine a more positive aftermath for the crisis. 
 
 
If, as some believe, current account crises will be a recurrent feature of emerging 
markets in years to come, the issue of how to ensure a quick return of growth in the 
aftermath of the crisis deserves more attention. Policy recommendations focused on   4
improving such ex-post performance should go hand in hand with traditional 
prevention measures designed to avoid the crises.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a more specific definition and 
description of what we call current account crises. Section III looks at the aftermath of 
current account crises in terms of both export and import performance. Section IV 
explores the reasons for such dissimilar behavior. Section V concludes.  
 
II. Definition of Current Account Crises 
  
Of course, to start our analysis we need to have a description, of a current account 
crisis episode. There are two possible ways of defining when a country faces a 
current account crisis. The first is to use a priori information on what are considered 
crises experiences by analysts or experts. There would be no major disagreement, 
for example, in arguing that Mexico suffered a crisis at the end of 1994. However, 
choosing an episode on the basis of perceptions has two major drawbacks. If our 
empirical study wants to be as comprehensive as possible, it is difficult to make sure 
that no crises are left out. Also by choosing identifiable crises in an ex-post sense we 
may be focusing only on “ex-post relevant” episodes, biasing the results towards 
finding significant effects, when, if classified from an ex-ante perspective not much 
may be found.  
 
Thus we incline ourselves for a purely statistical procedure for identifying crises. 
While to some extent arbitrary,
5 we identify a country suffering a current account 
crisis when its capital account closes by 5% of GDP or more in particular year and 
the current account improves by more the 2% of GDP during that year, the following, 
or over those two years. The use of yearly data is justified in order to obtain as large 
a database as possible.  
 
We apply this definition to a database including all countries in the world, with 
available data since 1974. While the potential number of data points is 4942 country 
year observations, workable observations are much less due to late arrival of some 
countries to the data base or simply due to lack of data. From a total of xxxx usable 
data points we find a total of 256 cases that satisfy the above criteria. These 256 
constitute our current account crises database. Table A.1 in the appendix provides a 
comprehensive list of these cases.  
 
Table 1: Current Account Crisis per region 
Region 
Capital Account (%)
 year 0 
Current Account (%)  
year 0 
Current Account (%)  
year 1 
Industrials -6.2%  3.8%  0.9% 
                                             
5 Alternative computations with other cut points have been tried to check the robustness of the results.   5
Non-Industrials -12.4%  9.7%  2.5% 
Emerging and Ind.  -8.9%  5.3%  2.6% 
Africa -12.3%  9.0%  1.9% 
Asia -9.5%  7.0%  4.1% 
Middle East  -18.1%  16.7%  2.0% 
Latin America  -11.4%  9.6%  2.2% 
Eastern Europe  -10.4%  2.2%  4.2% 
Pacific -11.2%  10.1%  3.2% 
Total  -12.1% 9.4%  2.4% 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of some characteristics. As can be seen, the reversals 
in capital flows are fairly sizable and on average are of the order to 12%. Current 
account improvements are also sizable, on the order of 9.4% of GDP in the first year 
and 2.4% in the second year. (eliminating the 25% or event the 50% smallest 
countries, delivers virtually the same result).  
 
Figure 1 shows the number of sudden stops per year (ver tema 2000). As can be 
seen, and contrary to what is usually suspected, sudden stops have been a relatively 
common phenomena since the early 80s. Perhaps surprisingly the years 92/94 show 
a larger incidence of sudden stops than in the more “crises years” of 95/97. However, 










Figure 2 shows the incidence of sudden stops per regions. As can be seen Africa 
shows the largest incidence followed by Latin America, and much fewer in Asia. As 























































Industrials Africa Asia Latin America
number of episodes  6
The appendix 1 shows the incidence of sudden stops. Kuwait, Maldives and  
Singapore are the three countries with the largest number of sudden stops. Between 
1974 and 1999, these countries suffered a sudden stop 7 times, that is, more than 
once every four years. These countries are followed by the Republic of Congo (6 
times), Fiji, Guinea Bissau, Israel, Mauritania, Solomon Islands, Swaziland and Togo 
(5 times) and Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Gabon, Jordan, Lesotho, Nicaragua, 
Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Suriname and Tonga (4 times).  
 
Among the largest countries we find that Spain, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, 
Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Venezuela, Austria, Norway, Denmark, Turkey, Thailand, 
Finland, Argentina, Poland, Algeria, Singapore, Philippines and Kuwait all suffered 
sudden stops. The largest corresponds to troubled Thailand in 1997 (19.4% 
reversal), but the second largest corresponds to Singapore during the height of 
capital inflows in 1994 (15.4% reversal). 
 
III. Stylised facts on current account reversals  
 
Current account reversals have been large as described above. However, regional 
developments may differ. Figure 3 shows the pattern of current account reversals for 
industrial, Asian, Latin American and African countries.
6  As can be seen from the 
figure very distinct patterns emerge. On the one hand, as expected, the smallest 
adjustments occur among industrial countries. For this set of countries deficits are 
relatively small prior to the crisis and also are smaller the improvements after the 
crisis. Latin American and African countries experience increasing deficits until the 
crisis hits, when they suffer a very large adjustment. However, after the initial 
adjustment there are only minor further improvements. Both cases contrast starkly 
with that of Asian countries. For Asian countries, current account deficits are large (in 
fact larger than for African and Latin American countries) but are decreasing, rather 
than increasing, prior to the crisis. The year of the crisis they suffer a sizable 










                                             
6 We eliminated Middle East, Pacific countries and eastern European countries for which very few data 
points were available.  











latin america  7
This different pattern also makes itself visible when evaluating the evolution of 
exports and imports. Figures 4 and 5 compare exports and imports relative to that of 
the episode year for these four regions. In both cases we consider a window 
spanning the four years prior to the crisis and the four years after the crisis. As can 
be seen in Figure 4, prior to the crisis exports grow steadily in all regions. However 
after the crisis export performance differs dramatically. Export growth appears to be 













In terms of imports the story is equivalent. Imports grow prior the crisis in all regions. 
During the year of the crisis, while imports stagnate or grow very slowly in most 
regions, they fall substantially in the case of Latin America. In the aftermath of the 
crisis imports are slowest to recover also in Latin America, while they remain fairly 













Finally figures 6 and 7 show the contribution of exports and of imports to the 
improvement in the current account, measured as a share of GDP. The export figure 
shows the growth in exports as a percentage of GDP (measured as that of the 
episode year). The numbers are computed as an overall average for the region. As 





























latin america  8
can be seen Asian countries exhibit an increase in exports of about 20% of GDP 
compared to an increase of about 15% for industrial countries, of about 10% for Latin 













Import contribution is measured as the decline in imports as a percentage of GDP. 
Latin America shows the highest import contraction (about 5% for two years) 
whereas the remainder regions show a much smaller import contraction. Over the 
years import growth remains checked in Africa while they grow much faster for Latin 












IV. In search of fundamentals 
 
The above description of the data suggests that patterns of adjustment may differ per 
region. Regarding export performance in the aftermath of the crisis, Table 2 confirms 
that the adjustment for the cases of Latin America and Asia are significantly and 
statistically different. Export growth in Latin America appears to be weaker than 
elsewhere. As time elapses, it is clear that Asia’s export performance is superior to 
that of other regions. Table 3 allows for a richer model including a measure of 


























Latin America  9
financial dollarization (FLM), of size of the financial sector (QMM) and of openness, 
three variables that should be directly related to the ability of the economy to 
generate exports.
7 We find that liability dollarization and openness are significant. 
The results indicate that more open economies generate better export performance, 
while liability dollarization a worse export performance. Surprisingly, the size of the 
financial sector appears to be irrelevant.    
 
Table 4 shows a richer specification that includes government surpluses (DEFGDP) 
and regional exchange rate arrangements (LYSAVG2). As expected government 
surpluses contribute to a better export performance. 
8 
 
Moving to imports as stated in Table 5 there is, again, a difference between the 
contribution of imports to current account adjustment when comparing Asia and Latin 
America. As can be seen import contraction contributes to current account 
adjustment in Latin America the opposite being the case for Asia.  In Table 6 we 
expand the model to allow for liability dollarization, size of the financial sector and 
openness. As expected countries with liability dollarization suffer significant import 
contractions, while imports continue to grow in open economies.  Once again the size 
of the financial sector appears to be irrelevant.  As shown in Table 7, in contrast to 
export performance, government surpluses or regional exchange rate regimes 
appear irrelevant. 
 
In short the data indicates that the differences in the regions arise from three 
variables. Liability dollarization of the financial sectors, that contributes to weak 
export performance and to import contraction. Openness, that is associated to better 
export and import performance in the aftermath of the crisis. And fiscal surpluses, 
that are associated to strong export growth in the aftermath of the crisis. 











                                             
7 Exact definitions and sources are provided in Appendix 2.  
8 We experimented with  XXXXX but these appeared insignificant. So is the case in Chinn and Prasad 










Table 2:  
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
  dex1gdp dex2gdp dex3gdp dex4gdp 
INDUS  -0.070 -0.008 0.084  0.147 
  (0.144) (0.194) (0.260) (0.321) 
AFRICA -0.058 -0.046 -0.011 0.003 
  (0.069) (0.097) (0.134) (0.167) 
ASIA 0.102  0.333**  0.726***  1.213*** 
  (0.097) (0.137) (0.198) (0.260) 
LATAM -0.283***  -0.330***  -0.366**  -0.404** 
  (0.074) (0.102) (0.142) (0.177) 
CONSTANT 0.155*** 0.170**  0.166  0.158 
  (0.052) (0.073) (0.104) (0.129) 
Observations  236 221 203 195 
R-squared  0.09 0.11 0.14 0.17 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  

























 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
  dex1gdp dex2gdp dex3gdp dex4gdp 
INDUS  -0.105 -0.055 0.039  0.091 
  (0.100) (0.112) (0.110) (0.119) 
AFRICA -0.123**  -0.127**  -0.057 -0.032 
  (0.055) (0.063) (0.063) (0.070) 
ASIA  -0.110 -0.091 0.030  0.158 
  (0.091) (0.111) (0.121) (0.168) 
LATAM -0.141***  -0.139**  -0.069  -0.046 
  (0.054) (0.062) (0.063) (0.069) 
FLM -0.007***  -0.008***  -0.008***  -0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
QMM  -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
OPENNESS 0.128  0.275**  0.311**  0.374** 
  (0.112) (0.129) (0.131) (0.144) 
CONSTANT 0.163**  0.125  0.071  0.008 
  (0.068) (0.079) (0.079) (0.087) 
Observations  175 164 153 146 
R-squared  0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 4: 
 
  (I)  (II) (III)  (IV) (V)  (VI) (VII)  (VIII) 
  dex1gdp dex1gdp dex2gdp dex2gdp dex3gdp dex3gdp dex4gdp dex4gdp 
INDUS  -0.086 -0.059 -0.052 -0.099 0.053  -0.013 0.105  -0.000 
  (0.084) (0.119) (0.115) (0.169) (0.118) (0.175) (0.125) (0.192) 
AFRICA  -0.152** -0.201** -0.186** -0.312*** -0.108  -0.248** -0.086  -0.177 
  (0.058) (0.082) (0.082) (0.118) (0.086) (0.122) (0.093) (0.136) 
ASIA  -0.115 -0.083 -0.118 -0.138 0.019  -0.046 0.158  0.129 
  (0.077) (0.103) (0.113) (0.153) (0.128) (0.171) (0.173) (0.225) 
LATAM  -0.078 -0.090 -0.100 -0.180*  -0.034 -0.149 0.013  -0.093 
  (0.057) (0.074) (0.079) (0.107) (0.086) (0.114) (0.093) (0.125) 
FLM  -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
QMM  -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.006 0.001  0.002 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
OPENNESS 0.095  0.109  0.372**  0.377*  0.518*** 0.511**  0.640*** 0.605*** 
  (0.118) (0.136) (0.165) (0.191) (0.176) (0.201) (0.193) (0.225) 
DEFGDP  0.011*** 0.008**  0.010*** 0.011**  0.006  0.017**  0.005  0.018** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
LYSAVG2   0.202   0.255   0.237   0.017 
  (0.166)   (0.240)   (0.257)   (0.299) 
CONSTANT 0.199*** -0.292  0.135  -0.392  0.023  -0.383  -0.064  0.084 
  (0.069) (0.422) (0.098) (0.613) (0.102) (0.657) (0.111) (0.762) 
Observati
ons 
118  89 109  82 101  74 95 69 
R-squared  0.36 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.27 0.36 0.26 0.35 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   14
Table 5: 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
  dim1gdp dim2gdp dim3gdp dim4gdp 
INDUS -0.003  0.007 -0.003  -0.075 
  (0.130) (0.186) (0.260) (0.325) 
AFRICA -0.001 0.024  0.045  0.032 
  (0.063) (0.093) (0.134) (0.169) 
ASIA -0.185**  -0.363***  -0.718***  -1.262*** 
  (0.087) (0.131) (0.198) (0.263) 
LATAM 0.197***  0.259***  0.340**  0.351* 
  (0.066) (0.097) (0.142) (0.179) 
CONSTANT  -0.002 -0.079 -0.148 -0.168 
  (0.047) (0.070) (0.104) (0.131) 
Observations  235 221 203 195 
R-squared  0.08 0.10 0.13 0.17 
 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 6: 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
  dim1gdp dim2gdp dim3gdp dim4gdp 
INDUS 0.010 0.017 0.010 -0.026 
  (0.080) (0.102) (0.111) (0.110) 
AFRICA  0.053 0.088 0.115*  0.117* 
  (0.044) (0.058) (0.064) (0.064) 
ASIA  0.055 0.103 0.067 -0.131 
  (0.073) (0.102) (0.122) (0.155) 
LATAM 0.051 0.051 0.031 -0.021 
  (0.043) (0.056) (0.063) (0.063) 
FLM 0.007***  0.008***  0.009***  0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
QMM  0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.004 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
OPENNESS -0.183** -0.389***  -0.523***  -0.624*** 
  (0.090) (0.118) (0.133) (0.133) 
CONSTANT  0.043 0.058 0.062 0.111 
  (0.054) (0.072) (0.080) (0.081) 
Observations  174 164 153 146 
R-squared  0.16 0.16 0.19 0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  

















   17
Table 7: 
 
  (I) (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) (VI)  (VII)  (VIII) 
  dim1gdp dim1gdp dim2gdp dim2gdp dim3gdp dim3gdp dim4gdp dim4gdp 
INDUS 0.035 0.066 0.063 0.204 0.047 0.186 0.008 0.169 
  (0.069) (0.102) (0.101) (0.152) (0.117) (0.181) (0.115) (0.178) 
AFRICA  0.066 0.132*  0.120 0.231**  0.107 0.208 0.120 0.153 
  (0.048) (0.070) (0.073) (0.106) (0.086) (0.126) (0.086) (0.126) 
ASIA  0.073 0.123 0.142 0.260*  0.101 0.223 -0.097  -0.059 
  (0.063) (0.088) (0.100) (0.137) (0.128) (0.177) (0.159) (0.208) 
LATAM 0.052 0.100 0.085 0.208**  0.075 0.200*  0.032 0.127 
  (0.047) (0.063) (0.070) (0.096) (0.085) (0.118) (0.086) (0.116) 
FLM  0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
QMM  0.003 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.001 -0.001 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
OPENNESS -0.080  -0.087  -0.306** -0.303*  -0.466***  -0.467** -0.604***  -0.577*** 
  (0.097) (0.117) (0.145) (0.171) (0.176) (0.208) (0.178) (0.208) 
DEFGDP -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) 
LYSAVG2   -0.076   0.003   0.033   0.244 
  (0.142)   (0.215)   (0.266)   (0.277) 
CONSTANT  -0.030 0.097  -0.033 -0.185 -0.012 -0.252 0.052  -0.688 
  (0.057) (0.361) (0.086) (0.550) (0.102) (0.679) (0.103) (0.706) 
Observati
ons 
118 89  109 82  101 74  95  69 
R-squared  0.27 0.31 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.30 
 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    18
       
V. Conclusions 
 
Our analysis has focused on understanding why countries react differently to 
current account adjustments. The discussion is not only of academic interest. 
Countries have suffered substantial reversals in capital flows over the recent years 
suggesting that instability and capital flow reversals are a common occurrence in 
financial markets and will probably continue to be. Thus the policy discussion 
should include a discussion of the factors that contribute to prepare the economy 
for the aftermath of a sudden stop and current account reversal. Our discussion 
has shown that the response of Asian countries appears in strong contrast to that 
of other regions. However we saw that that different performance relates to 
differences in some fundamentals.  
 
Among the most interesting results we found that open economies are more likely 
to exhibit a successful export and import performance in the aftermath of a crisis. 
But what appears most intriguing are the results related to the characteristics of 
the financial sector. Liability dollarization appears to be detrimental to good export 
performance, probably due to the destruction in property rights and the financial 
collapse that accompanies the likely devaluation when the crisis hits. Similarly, 
liability dollarization is associated to import contraction in the aftermath of the 
crisis.  
 
This result is interesting when we note that the size of the financial sector appears 
to be irrelevant.
9 The negative role of liability dollarization suggests that 
pesification of financial sectors may be a good idea. While one could argue that 
pesification entails the risk that the financial sector may turn out to be smaller than 
otherwise possible, the fact that the size of the financial sector does not matter, 
suggests that that the benefits of allowing for a dollarized financial sector may not 
be so relevant. On the contrary, once could turn the argument upside down and 
even dare the conclusion that a larger financial sector in the face of a devaluation 
is even more dangerous than a smaller one, thus hurting growth prospects. These 
are interesting first results when thinking about how to prepare financial sectors for 








                                             
9 Eichengreen, et al show that there is not much relation between liability dollarization and the size 
of the financial sector, indicating that our dollarization measure is not indicating a size effect.   19
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Country Year Capital Acc. Current Acc.Current Acc.Country Year Capital Acc. Current Acc.Current Acc
(%)  (%) 0 (%) 1 (%)  (%) 0 (%) 1
ALBANIA 1995 -22.8 7.6 -3.5 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1992 -31.7 24.3 8.7
ALBANIA 1998 -10.7 9.7 -2.1 ESTONIA 1998 -6.5 2.6 3.6
ALGERIA 1979 -7.3 8.5 5.5 FIJI 1982 -6.3 6.0 2.1
ANGOLA 1993 -5.4 0.1 4.3 FIJI 1987 -7.1 1.0 4.1
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1983 -25.9 24.2 6.3 FIJI 1991 -5.6 2.2 0.7
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1987 -13.6 9.3 25.5 FIJI 1996 -6.4 6.4 -2.3
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1988 -23.7 25.5 -8.6 FINLAND 1995 -8.0 2.9 -0.1
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1990 -13.6 14.0 -0.2 GABON 1979 -6.0 5.1 0.8
ARGENTINA 1989 -11.0 -0.5 4.9 GABON 1987 -15.8 17.4 -2.4
ARMENIA 1999 -5.4 5.4 GABON 1989 -13.7 11.5 7.4
ARUBA 1992 -26.9 26.8 -1.0 GABON 1990 -9.6 7.4 -1.4
ARUBA 1994 -5.9 2.9 GAMBIA, THE 1982 -23.5 12.2 -5.3
ARUBA 1998 -5.7 10.8 GAMBIA, THE 1984 -20.8 20.3 -1.3
AUSTRIA 1982 -5.6 5.4 -0.6 GAMBIA, THE 1986 -13.7 -0.9 3.9
AZERBAIJAN 1999 -12.9 10.1 GEORGIA 1998 -8.0 -0.4 3.2
BAHAMAS, THE 1985 -5.9 4.8 1.0 GRENADA 1984 -18.3 18.2 -1.3
BAHAMAS, THE 1992 -8.2 7.0 0.3 GRENADA 1994 -9.3 9.1 -4.4
BAHRAIN 1993 -12.8 10.5 2.0 GUINEA 1989 -12.6 1.9 0.2
BARBADOS 1982 -8.0 8.9 -0.1 GUINEA-BISSAU 1986 -34.8 14.4 12.4
BARBADOS 1984 -7.6 5.4 3.0 GUINEA-BISSAU 1987 -5.8 12.4 -8.0
BARBADOS 1992 -6.2 10.4 -4.7 GUINEA-BISSAU 1989 -9.4 -3.7 19.1
BENIN 1983 -17.1 17.4 6.9 GUINEA-BISSAU 1993 -24.1 16.7 6.7
BENIN 1984 -5.7 6.9 1.7 GUINEA-BISSAU 1994 -8.4 6.7 5.6
BENIN 1989 -7.3 5.6 -0.1 GUYANA 1983 -11.2 -2.9 10.0
BOLIVIA 1982 -7.7 10.4 0.5 HUNGARY 1994 -9.0 1.3 4.1
BOLIVIA 1994 -8.2 7.3 -3.0 HUNGARY 1996 -17.0 1.9 1.6
BOTSWANA 1991 -6.1 8.2 -3.0 ICELAND 1993 -5.1 3.0 1.1
BRAZIL 1983 -5.3 2.4 3.4 INDONESIA 1997 -6.9 1.1 6.4
BULGARIA 1990 -14.8 -4.7 7.5 INDONESIA 1998 -6.4 6.4 -0.1
BULGARIA 1994 -16.9 9.8 0.1 IRAN, I.R. OF 1994 -14.0 15.0 -3.7
BULGARIA 1996 -11.9 0.4 4.1 IRELAND 1975 -5.6 7.7 -3.4
CANADA 1982 -5.9 4.8 -1.4 IRELAND 1992 -5.8 0.5 2.4
CAPE VERDE 1990 -10.3 3.2 -0.8 ISRAEL 1976 -6.4 9.4 2.8
CAPE VERDE 1995 -9.9 -1.4 5.6 ISRAEL 1979 -8.2 2.2 1.3
COMOROS 1985 -7.2 18.0 2.8 ISRAEL 1983 -6.5 1.0 2.2
COMOROS 1988 -14.0 7.7 5.9 ISRAEL 1985 -6.5 10.3 0.2
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1979 -8.9 12.3 -1.5 ISRAEL 1988 -6.1 2.0 1.9
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1982 -13.8 7.8 -3.8 JAMAICA 1985 -9.2 0.0 12.3
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1984 -29.9 28.7 -17.0 JAMAICA 1986 -12.7 12.3 -3.5
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1987 -22.5 22.8 -10.4 JORDAN 1979 -11.2 10.8 7.3
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1989 -12.3 16.6 -5.4 JORDAN 1984 -7.3 2.5 0.3
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1997 -42.6 32.8 JORDAN 1993 -17.1 4.2 5.0
COTE D IVOIRE 1983 -6.1 -0.2 12.5 JORDAN 1998 -9.0 -0.1 4.6
COTE D IVOIRE 1984 -9.2 12.5 2.0 KIRIBATI 1983 -24.8 25.4 18.2
COTE D IVOIRE 1996 -6.3 3.4 0.3 KIRIBATI 1987 -5.4 -1.8 7.3
CYPRUS 1985 -7.7 2.3 6.8 KIRIBATI 1994 -5.7 15.7
CYPRUS 1993 -5.5 10.9 -0.7 KUWAIT 1978 -16.8 7.3 17.2
CHILE 1982 -11.8 5.0 3.8 KUWAIT 1979 -12.8 17.2 -3.3
CHILE 1985 -9.4 2.4 1.9 KUWAIT 1983 -6.8 2.4 4.2
CHILE 1998 -6.4 -0.7 5.6 KUWAIT 1992 -240.5 238.2 12.7
DENMARK 1989 -5.0 0.2 2.1 KUWAIT 1993 -27.3 12.7 2.6
DJIBOUTI 1993 -10.5 11.4 -2.2 KUWAIT 1995 -6.7 5.9 4.0
DJIBOUTI 1995 -9.9 4.8 KUWAIT 1999 -8.4 8.4
DOMINICA 1981 -11.0 4.9 8.5 LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.RE 1997 -13.8 2.2 5.9
DOMINICA 1983 -12.0 8.6 -5.7 LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.RE 1998 -6.1 5.9 12.3
DOMINICA 1991 -7.4 7.5 5.4 LESOTHO 1977 -16.0 15.7 6.8
DOMINICA 1996 -7.7 5.3 3.1 LESOTHO 1978 -7.2 6.8 -2.7
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1975 -5.2 6.2 -1.2 LESOTHO 1989 -7.1 6.8 8.5
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1981 -5.2 5.5 -0.2 LESOTHO 1999 -23.6 6.6
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1993 -7.4 2.5 2.8 LIBERIA 1984 -11.6 9.5 5.2
ECUADOR 1983 -13.7 7.6 -1.2 MALAWI 1981 -9.5 9.2 2.3
ECUADOR 1988 -10.1 4.5 -0.5 MALAYSIA 1984 -5.1 6.6 2.9
ECUADOR 1999 -15.7 16.0 MALAYSIA 1987 -10.0 8.4 -2.7
EGYPT 1990 -26.1 -0.3 11.8 MALAYSIA 1999 -10.7 2.8
EL SALVADOR 1979 -14.4 9.8 0.0 MALDIVES 1981 -9.6 7.2 5.2  21
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(%)  (%) 0 (%) 1 (%)  (%) 0 (%) 1
MALDIVES 1983 -17.3 -2.0 20.1 SIERRA LEONE 1981 -5.6 3.6 -1.5
MALDIVES 1984 -20.5 20.1 15.3 SIERRA LEONE 1983 -12.6 10.6 -0.2
MALDIVES 1985 -6.5 15.3 6.2 SIERRA LEONE 1991 -9.2 9.6 -2.7
MALDIVES 1986 -5.6 6.2 9.0 SINGAPORE 1975 -7.9 9.4 0.7
MALDIVES 1987 -10.1 9.0 -0.5 SINGAPORE 1977 -5.4 5.1 -1.3
MALDIVES 1994 -17.2 20.1 -2.1 SINGAPORE 1983 -6.6 5.0 1.5
MAURITANIA 1983 -6.0 9.8 11.8 SINGAPORE 1988 -7.0 8.2 2.2
MAURITANIA 1984 -9.3 11.8 -1.8 SINGAPORE 1991 -7.9 2.9 0.7
MAURITANIA 1987 -18.9 8.0 6.2 SINGAPORE 1994 -15.4 9.0 0.9
MAURITANIA 1993 -22.8 -8.5 11.6 SINGAPORE 1998 -10.3 7.5 -0.4
MAURITANIA 1996 -5.2 6.1 -3.8 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1976 -26.7 27.4 6.0
MAURITIUS 1981 -6.3 -2.5 9.0 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1983 -8.6 8.3 11.7
MAURITIUS 1991 -5.9 3.9 0.6 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1986 -12.8 15.8 -1.0
MEXICO 1982 -8.0 2.3 6.9 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1998 -12.0 12.9 4.4
MEXICO 1995 -8.1 6.5 -0.1 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1999 -12.4 4.4
MOLDOVA 1998 -5.5 -5.7 18.5 SOMALIA 1983 -18.9 3.6 1.6
MOROCCO 1978 -7.0 6.6 0.5 SPAIN 1992 -5.6 0.0 2.4
MOROCCO 1995 -5.8 -1.2 3.7 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1984 -18.0 18.5 -2.4
MOZAMBIQUE 1983 -6.3 0.9 3.7 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1991 -8.8 8.3 12.5
MOZAMBIQUE 1984 -6.1 3.7 2.4 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1992 -7.2 12.5 -6.5
MOZAMBIQUE 1997 -5.1 6.1 -2.6 ST. LUCIA 1983 -19.7 18.3 -3.6
NEPAL 1999 -6.5 5.3 ST. LUCIA 1992 -5.9 5.2 1.4
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1982 -10.7 10.4 -7.8 ST. VINCENT & GRENS 1981 -11.0 14.4 -11.6
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1984 -8.5 7.5 19.6 ST. VINCENT & GRENS 1983 -5.2 9.9 1.8
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1985 -9.8 19.6 ST. VINCENT & GRENS 1995 -9.2 8.2 2.9
NICARAGUA 1978 -13.8 7.0 12.7 SURINAME 1984 -5.2 14.3 12.3
NICARAGUA 1986 -19.6 4.8 6.0 SURINAME 1987 -10.5 16.0 -3.6
NICARAGUA 1990 -16.5 5.5 13.0 SURINAME 1989 -43.5 44.4 -32.2
NICARAGUA 1994 -25.7 -2.1 10.0 SURINAME 1992 -27.8 44.2 6.5
NIGER 1983 -5.6 8.1 3.5 SWAZILAND 1984 -7.3 3.6 5.0
NIGERIA 1984 -8.0 12.8 8.7 SWAZILAND 1986 -10.2 13.0 8.8
NIGERIA 1996 -11.4 19.1 -8.4 SWAZILAND 1987 -7.0 8.8 2.4
NIGERIA 1999 -15.8 14.6 SWAZILAND 1993 -13.7 -2.3 6.6
NORWAY 1978 -6.2 7.9 2.6 SWAZILAND 1999 -8.1 2.8
OMAN 1979 -10.6 16.5 1.1 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBL 1978 -5.1 1.5 9.7
OMAN 1987 -14.5 24.2 -14.1 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBL 1979 -6.6 9.7 -7.1
PANAMA 1982 -6.8 8.3 8.1 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBL 1989 -14.2 13.8 1.9
PANAMA 1985 -5.4 5.4 -3.2 TANZANIA 1994 -5.6 6.9 2.9
PANAMA 1987 -20.7 11.4 5.1 THAILAND 1997 -19.4 6.1 14.7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1985 -8.3 6.3 1.3 THAILAND 1998 -5.0 14.7 -2.7
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1992 -5.5 6.2 10.8 TOGO 1979 -6.7 2.5 15.5
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1993 -10.8 10.8 -2.4 TOGO 1980 -16.6 15.5 3.8
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1998 -5.3 3.2 2.1 TOGO 1984 -6.5 9.3 -7.2
PARAGUAY 1988 -11.6 6.8 7.9 TOGO 1992 -7.3 0.6 1.5
PARAGUAY 1989 -5.6 7.9 1.7 TOGO 1993 -7.5 1.5 0.9
PERU 1983 -6.7 1.9 3.4 TONGA 1981 -5.6 3.6 19.9
PERU 1984 -5.8 3.4 1.7 TONGA 1982 -17.3 19.9 -9.7
PHILIPPINES 1983 -8.8 0.2 4.2 TONGA 1985 -13.9 9.7 1.0
PHILIPPINES 1997 -8.5 -0.5 7.6 TONGA 1989 -27.5 20.8 -1.6
PHILIPPINES 1999 -5.1 8.0 TURKEY 1994 -5.6 5.6 -3.4
POLAND 1994 -12.0 7.7 -0.2 UKRAINE 1998 -6.2 -0.5 7.3
PORTUGAL 1983 -9.5 5.2 3.9 URUGUAY 1982 -6.4 1.6 1.3
ROMANIA 1998 -5.7 -0.4 3.2 VANUATU 1990 -11.6 4.6 -1.3
RUSSIA 1998 -6.0 0.0 4.9 VANUATU 1998 -7.7 13.6 -7.2
RWANDA 1995 -7.0 10.6 -5.1 VENEZUELA, REP. BOL 1980 -7.9 6.2 -1.7
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1977 -46.9 30.5 -10.7 VENEZUELA, REP. BOL 1989 -7.9 14.6 12.1
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1983 -14.8 30.6 -5.9 VENEZUELA, REP. BOL 1994 -9.5 7.7 -1.7
SAUDI ARABIA 1980 -15.3 17.6 -1.0 YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 1994 -28.4 36.8 -5.6
SAUDI ARABIA 1992 -13.6 8.9 -0.2 ZAMBIA 1987 -12.7 10.1 3.0
SAUDI ARABIA 1994 -7.2 5.8 4.6 ZAMBIA 1991 -21.1 9.0
SAUDI ARABIA 1999 -8.0 10.5
SENEGAL 1982 -8.2 8.3 -2.0
SEYCHELLES 1983 -11.3 9.7 9.0
SEYCHELLES 1984 -8.3 9.0 -2.6
SEYCHELLES 1987 -5.3 7.5 -1.5
SEYCHELLES 1990 -7.9 9.3 1.3  22
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SPAIN 1992 -5.6 0.0 2.4 ECUADOR 1983 -13.7 7.6 -1.2
CANADA 1982 -5.9 4.8 -1.4 KUWAIT 1995 -6.7 5.9 4.0
SAUDI ARABIA 1980 -15.3 17.6 -1.0 BULGARIA 1990 -14.8 -4.7 7.5
MEXICO 1982 -8.0 2.3 6.9 SINGAPORE 1975 -7.9 9.4 0.7
BRAZIL 1983 -5.3 2.4 3.4 KUWAIT 1999 -8.4 8.4
MEXICO 1995 -8.1 6.5 -0.1 SINGAPORE 1977 -5.4 5.1 -1.3
RUSSIA 1998 -6.0 0.0 4.9 YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 1994 -28.4 36.8 -5.6
INDONESIA 1997 -6.9 1.1 6.4 KUWAIT 1992 -240.5 238.2 12.7
VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 1980 -7.9 6.2 -1.7 URUGUAY 1982 -6.4 1.6 1.3
AUSTRIA 1982 -5.6 5.4 -0.6 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1981 -5.2 5.5 -0.2
NORWAY 1978 -6.2 7.9 2.6 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1975 -5.2 6.2 -1.2
DENMARK 1989 -5.0 0.2 2.1 ECUADOR 1988 -10.1 4.5 -0.5
SAUDI ARABIA 1992 -13.6 8.9 -0.2 COTE D IVOIRE 1983 -6.1 -0.2 12.5
TURKEY 1994 -5.6 5.6 -3.4 OMAN 1987 -14.5 24.2 -14.1
THAILAND 1997 -19.4 6.1 14.7 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 1989 -14.2 13.8 1.9
FINLAND 1995 -8.0 2.9 -0.1 COTE D IVOIRE 1984 -9.2 12.5 2.0
SAUDI ARABIA 1994 -7.2 5.8 4.6 OMAN 1979 -10.6 16.5 1.1
SAUDI ARABIA 1999 -8.0 10.5 EL SALVADOR 1979 -14.4 9.8 0.0
ARGENTINA 1989 -11.0 -0.5 4.9 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1993 -7.4 2.5 2.8
POLAND 1994 -12.0 7.7 -0.2 PANAMA 1982 -6.8 8.3 8.1
ALGERIA 1979 -7.3 8.5 5.5 ECUADOR 1999 -15.7 16.0
THAILAND 1998 -5.0 14.7 -2.7 COTE D IVOIRE 1996 -6.3 3.4 0.3
INDONESIA 1998 -6.4 6.4 -0.1 BULGARIA 1994 -16.9 9.8 0.1
SINGAPORE 1994 -15.4 9.0 0.9 JORDAN 1984 -7.3 2.5 0.3
PHILIPPINES 1997 -8.5 -0.5 7.6 PANAMA 1985 -5.4 5.4 -3.2
KUWAIT 1979 -12.8 17.2 -3.3 BULGARIA 1996 -11.9 0.4 4.1
SINGAPORE 1998 -10.3 7.5 -0.4 PANAMA 1987 -20.7 11.4 5.1
PHILIPPINES 1983 -8.8 0.2 4.2 JORDAN 1979 -11.2 10.8 7.3
IRAN, I.R. OF 1994 -14.0 15.0 -3.7 BOLIVIA 1982 -7.7 10.4 0.5
NIGERIA 1984 -8.0 12.8 8.7 GABON 1990 -9.6 7.4 -1.4
MALAYSIA 1984 -5.1 6.6 2.9 NICARAGUA 1986 -19.6 4.8 6.0
ISRAEL 1988 -6.1 2.0 1.9 CYPRUS 1993 -5.5 10.9 -0.7
IRELAND 1992 -5.8 0.5 2.4 MOZAMBIQUE 1983 -6.3 0.9 3.7
MALAYSIA 1999 -10.7 2.8 ICELAND 1993 -5.1 3.0 1.1
CHILE 1998 -6.4 -0.7 5.6 GABON 1979 -6.0 5.1 0.8
VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 1994 -9.5 7.7 -1.7 MOZAMBIQUE 1984 -6.1 3.7 2.4
PHILIPPINES 1999 -5.1 8.0 BOLIVIA 1994 -8.2 7.3 -3.0
VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 1989 -7.9 14.6 12.1 ANGOLA 1993 -5.4 0.1 4.3
ISRAEL 1976 -6.4 9.4 2.8 JORDAN 1993 -17.1 4.2 5.0
CHILE 1982 -11.8 5.0 3.8 JORDAN 1998 -9.0 -0.1 4.6
ISRAEL 1983 -6.5 1.0 2.2 SENEGAL 1982 -8.2 8.3 -2.0
SINGAPORE 1991 -7.9 2.9 0.7 BAHRAIN 1993 -12.8 10.5 2.0
ISRAEL 1979 -8.2 2.2 1.3 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1993 -10.8 10.8 -2.4
PORTUGAL 1983 -9.5 5.2 3.9 GABON 1989 -13.7 11.5 7.4
KUWAIT 1978 -16.8 7.3 17.2 PARAGUAY 1989 -5.6 7.9 1.7
MALAYSIA 1987 -10.0 8.4 -2.7 GABON 1987 -15.8 17.4 -2.4
EGYPT 1990 -26.1 -0.3 11.8 PARAGUAY 1988 -11.6 6.8 7.9
HUNGARY 1994 -9.0 1.3 4.1 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1992 -5.5 6.2 10.8
HUNGARY 1996 -17.0 1.9 1.6 TANZANIA 1994 -5.6 6.9 2.9
MOROCCO 1978 -7.0 6.6 0.5 BOTSWANA 1991 -6.1 8.2 -3.0
KUWAIT 1983 -6.8 2.4 4.2 NICARAGUA 1978 -13.8 7.0 12.7
ISRAEL 1985 -6.5 10.3 0.2 ESTONIA 1998 -6.5 2.6 3.6
IRELAND 1975 -5.6 7.7 -3.4 JAMAICA 1986 -12.7 12.3 -3.5
PERU 1983 -6.7 1.9 3.4 CYPRUS 1985 -7.7 2.3 6.8
PERU 1984 -5.8 3.4 1.7 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1985 -8.3 6.3 1.3
SINGAPORE 1988 -7.0 8.2 2.2 CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1979 -8.9 12.3 -1.5
SINGAPORE 1983 -6.6 5.0 1.5 ZAMBIA 1991 -21.1 9.0
UKRAINE 1998 -6.2 -0.5 7.3 NEPAL 1999 -6.5 5.3
ROMANIA 1998 -5.7 -0.4 3.2 JAMAICA 1985 -9.2 0.0 12.3
NIGERIA 1996 -11.4 19.1 -8.4 BAHAMAS, THE 1985 -5.9 4.8 1.0
MOROCCO 1995 -5.8 -1.2 3.7 NIGER 1983 -5.6 8.1 3.5
CHILE 1985 -9.4 2.4 1.9 BAHAMAS, THE 1992 -8.2 7.0 0.3
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 1979 -6.6 9.7 -7.1 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 1998 -5.3 3.2 2.1
NIGERIA 1999 -15.8 14.6 ZAMBIA 1987 -12.7 10.1 3.0
KUWAIT 1993 -27.3 12.7 2.6 MAURITIUS 1991 -5.9 3.9 0.6
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 1978 -5.1 1.5 9.7 CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1982 -13.8 7.8 -3.8  23
 
Country Year Capital Acc. Current Acc.Current Acc.Country Year Capital Acc. Current Acc.Current Acc
(%)  (%) 0 (%) 1 (%)  (%) 0 (%) 1
MAURITIUS 1991 -5.9 3.9 0.6 SEYCHELLES 1990 -7.9 9.3 1.3
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1982 -13.8 7.8 -3.8 SURINAME 1989 -43.5 44.4 -32.2
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1987 -22.5 22.8 -10.4 ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1987 -13.6 9.3 25.5
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1982 -10.7 10.4 -7.8 SURINAME 1992 -27.8 44.2 6.5
GUINEA 1989 -12.6 1.9 0.2 GAMBIA, THE 1984 -20.8 20.3 -1.3
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1989 -12.3 16.6 -5.4 CAPE VERDE 1990 -10.3 3.2 -0.8
TOGO 1980 -16.6 15.5 3.8 SEYCHELLES 1987 -5.3 7.5 -1.5
MOZAMBIQUE 1997 -5.1 6.1 -2.6 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1976 -26.7 27.4 6.0
TOGO 1979 -6.7 2.5 15.5 GUINEA-BISSAU 1986 -34.8 14.4 12.4
AZERBAIJAN 1999 -12.9 10.1 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1983 -8.6 8.3 11.7
SIERRA LEONE 1981 -5.6 3.6 -1.5 GAMBIA, THE 1986 -13.7 -0.9 3.9
MALAWI 1981 -9.5 9.2 2.3 SURINAME 1987 -10.5 16.0 -3.6
MAURITIUS 1981 -6.3 -2.5 9.0 ST. LUCIA 1983 -19.7 18.3 -3.6
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1984 -8.5 7.5 19.6 ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1983 -25.9 24.2 6.3
FIJI 1982 -6.3 6.0 2.1 SEYCHELLES 1983 -11.3 9.7 9.0
ALBANIA 1998 -10.7 9.7 -2.1 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1998 -12.0 12.9 4.4
SIERRA LEONE 1983 -12.6 10.6 -0.2 COMOROS 1988 -14.0 7.7 5.9
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1985 -9.8 19.6 GUINEA-BISSAU 1987 -5.8 12.4 -8.0
ALBANIA 1995 -22.8 7.6 -3.5 GUINEA-BISSAU 1989 -9.4 -3.7 19.1
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1984 -29.9 28.7 -17.0 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1999 -12.4 4.4
GEORGIA 1998 -8.0 -0.4 3.2 SEYCHELLES 1984 -8.3 9.0 -2.6
BARBADOS 1982 -8.0 8.9 -0.1 GRENADA 1994 -9.3 9.1 -4.4
BARBADOS 1984 -7.6 5.4 3.0 GUINEA-BISSAU 1993 -24.1 16.7 6.7
CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 1997 -42.6 32.8 ST. VINCENT & GRENS. 1995 -9.2 8.2 2.9
BENIN 1989 -7.3 5.6 -0.1 MALDIVES 1994 -17.2 20.1 -2.1
NICARAGUA 1990 -16.5 5.5 13.0 GUINEA-BISSAU 1994 -8.4 6.7 5.6
TOGO 1992 -7.3 0.6 1.5 DOMINICA 1996 -7.7 5.3 3.1
BENIN 1983 -17.1 17.4 6.9 DOMINICA 1991 -7.4 7.5 5.4
FIJI 1996 -6.4 6.4 -2.3 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1992 -7.2 12.5 -6.5
NICARAGUA 1994 -25.7 -2.1 10.0 SOLOMON ISLANDS 1986 -12.8 15.8 -1.0
BENIN 1984 -5.7 6.9 1.7 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1991 -8.8 8.3 12.5
BARBADOS 1992 -6.2 10.4 -4.7 COMOROS 1985 -7.2 18.0 2.8
FIJI 1987 -7.1 1.0 4.1 ST. VINCENT & GRENS. 1983 -5.2 9.9 1.8
FIJI 1991 -5.6 2.2 0.7 VANUATU 1990 -11.6 4.6 -1.3
MAURITANIA 1983 -6.0 9.8 11.8 GRENADA 1984 -18.3 18.2 -1.3
MOLDOVA 1998 -5.5 -5.7 18.5 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 1992 -31.7 24.3 8.7
ARMENIA 1999 -5.4 5.4 VANUATU 1998 -7.7 13.6 -7.2
MAURITANIA 1987 -18.9 8.0 6.2 ST. VINCENT & GRENS. 1981 -11.0 14.4 -11.6
GUYANA 1983 -11.2 -2.9 10.0 DOMINICA 1983 -12.0 8.6 -5.7
TOGO 1993 -7.5 1.5 0.9 MALDIVES 1986 -5.6 6.2 9.0
MAURITANIA 1984 -9.3 11.8 -1.8 DOMINICA 1981 -11.0 4.9 8.5
TOGO 1984 -6.5 9.3 -7.2 MALDIVES 1985 -6.5 15.3 6.2
RWANDA 1995 -7.0 10.6 -5.1 TONGA 1989 -27.5 20.8 -1.6
SURINAME 1984 -5.2 14.3 12.3 TONGA 1981 -5.6 3.6 19.9
LESOTHO 1978 -7.2 6.8 -2.7 MALDIVES 1987 -10.1 9.0 -0.5
SWAZILAND 1993 -13.7 -2.3 6.6 TONGA 1982 -17.3 19.9 -9.7
MAURITANIA 1993 -22.8 -8.5 11.6 MALDIVES 1984 -20.5 20.1 15.3
SWAZILAND 1999 -8.1 2.8 MALDIVES 1983 -17.3 -2.0 20.1
MAURITANIA 1996 -5.2 6.1 -3.8 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 1984 -18.0 18.5 -2.4
SIERRA LEONE 1991 -9.2 9.6 -2.7 MALDIVES 1981 -9.6 7.2 5.2
SWAZILAND 1987 -7.0 8.8 2.4 SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1983 -14.8 30.6 -5.9
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.REP 1998 -6.1 5.9 12.3 TONGA 1985 -13.9 9.7 1.0
LESOTHO 1977 -16.0 15.7 6.8 SAO TOME & PRINCIPE 1977 -46.9 30.5 -10.7
LAO PEOPLE'S DEM.REP 1997 -13.8 2.2 5.9 KIRIBATI 1983 -24.8 25.4 18.2
SWAZILAND 1986 -10.2 13.0 8.8 KIRIBATI 1994 -5.7 15.7
LESOTHO 1989 -7.1 6.8 8.5 KIRIBATI 1987 -5.4 -1.8 7.3
LESOTHO 1999 -23.6 6.6 ARUBA 1992 -26.9 26.8 -1.0
SWAZILAND 1984 -7.3 3.6 5.0 ARUBA 1994 -5.9 2.9
ST. LUCIA 1992 -5.9 5.2 1.4 ARUBA 1998 -5.7 10.8
GAMBIA, THE 1982 -23.5 12.2 -5.3 LIBERIA 1984 -11.6 9.5 5.2
DJIBOUTI 1993 -10.5 11.4 -2.2 SOMALIA 1983 -18.9 3.6 1.6
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1990 -13.6 14.0 -0.2
DJIBOUTI 1995 -9.9 4.8
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 1988 -23.7 25.5 -8.6
CAPE VERDE 1995 -9.9 -1.4 5.6  24
Table A.3 
Variables  Definition and Source 
AFRICA  Dummy variable for african countries. 
ASIA  Dummy variable for asiatic countries. 
DEFGDP  Ratio of Deficit (or surplus) to GDP (Source: IMF line 80 / line 99b) 
DCREDITVAR 
 
Domestic Credit Variation (Source: IMF line 42D) 
FLM  Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money (Source: IMF  line 16C/ line 34). 
INDUS  Dummy variable for industrial countries. 
LATAM  Dummy variable for Latin American countries. 
LYSAVG  Average de facto exchange rate regime of the region (Source: Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
OPENNESS  Openness, (ratio of [export + import]/2 to GDP) (Source: IMF (line 
90c+line 98c)/2/ line 99b). 
QMM  Ratio of Quasi Money over Money (Source: IMF line 35/ line 34) 
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